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The question of assumption of risk continues to be troublesome.
So much has been written on this subject and so much confusion
exists that it is an exercise in futility to even try to discuss it.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Should a plaintiff's voluntary encounter with a known and appreci-
ated risk of injury absolve a product manufacturer of liability for any
injuries caused as a result of a defective product? Significant schol-
arly and judicial resources have been devoted to answering this ques-
tion over the past fifty years. 2 Numerous commentators,3 along with
1. Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 412, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Knox D. Nunnally & B. Lee Ware, Defenses in Personal Injury Product
1
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a growing minority of states, favor abolishing assumption of risk as a
separate defense in products liability cases. 4 These proponents be-
lieve assumption of risk should be treated as a phase of contributory
negligence, and comparative fault principles should be applied.5
Consistent with this trend, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Sprin-
grose v. Willmore,6 held that assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence would be apportioned under the comparative negligence
statute.7 The court, however, distinguished between primary and
secondary assumption of risk.8 While primary assumption of risk,
Liability Cases: Assumption of Risk and Misuse With a View Toward Comparative Fault, 20 S.
TEX. L.J. 221 (1979) (discussing the application of comparative fault statute in strict
products liability); Aaron D. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption
of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REV. 1 (1974) (discussing the reincarna-
tion of assumption of risk defenses in strict products liability cases); Robert E. Kee-
ton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. LJ. 61 (1965) [hereinafter Products Risks]
(exploring the confused terminology over assumption of risk); Robert E. Keeton, As-
sumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122 (1961) [hereinafter Prod-
ucts Liability] (discussing definitional problems and the expansion of assumption of
risk defense in products liability cases).
3. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory
of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 919-20 (1981) (addressing the growing trend toward
abolition of assumption of risk defense); Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse:
An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403
(1978); Henry Woods, The Trend Toward Comparative Fault, 7 J. PROD. LIAB. 399
(1984).
4. An increasing number of jurisdictions have merged the assumption of risk
doctrine, either judicially or by statute, into the comparative fault doctrine. See, e.g.,
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977):
We find no discernible basis analytically or historically to maintain a distinc-
tion between the affirmative defense of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk. [Would the fault principles of tort law and comparative
negligence be advanced by] a doctrine which would totally bar recovery by
one who voluntarily, but reasonably, assumes a known risk while one whose
conduct is unreasonable but denominated "contributory negligence" is per-
mitted to recover a proportionate amount of his damages for injury? Cer-
tainly not.
Id. at 292-93; see also Varilek v. Mitchell Eng'g. Co., 558 N.E.2d 365, 377-78 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (holding that assumption of risk not available as a separate defense with the
adoption of comparative fault), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 709 (1990); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hi-Tower Concrete Pumping Serv., Inc., 574 So. 2d 424, 435
(La. Ct. App. 1991) ("After the adoption of comparative negligence, the doctrine of
assumption of risk no longer has a place in Louisiana tort law."); Central Tel. Co. v.
Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 738 P.2d 510, 512 (Nev. 1987) (state comparative negligence
statute subsumes implied assumption of risk defense; assumption of risk defense still
applicable in strict liability); Guido v. New York Tel. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (holding that while implied assumption of risk diminishes plaintiff's
damages, express assumption of risk continues to operate as a complete bar to
recovery).
5. See supra notes 3-4.
6. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
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ASSUMPTION OF RISK
express or implied, is a legal conclusion that the defendant owes no
duty to protect the plaintiff from harm, secondary assumption of risk
is an affirmative defense to an established breach of duty.9
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature modified the Comparative
Fault Act to broaden the scope of plaintiff defenses that are subject
to the Act.lO Under the Act, primary assumption of risk remains a
complete defense." I However, since the adoption of the Act, the dis-
tinctions between primary and secondary assumption of risk have be-
come blurred. Today, defenses such as product misuse, contributory
negligence, unreasonable failure to avoid an injury, and secondary
assumption of risk are compared with the manufacturers' negligence
and strict liability in apportioning fault.12
Almost twenty years after the Minnesota Supreme Court and the
legislature expressly abolished secondary assumption of risk as a dis-
tinct defense, the doctrine is once again operating to relieve defend-
ants of liability where a plaintiff establishes a breach of the
defendant's duty of care. In Andren v. White Rodgers,'s the plaintiff
was injured when he lit a cigarette near a room filled with liquid pro-
pane gas which had leaked from a defective regulator on a gas
heater.14 The court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff's act of
lighting a cigarette-with full knowledge and appreciation of the risk
of an explosion-manifested consent to relieve the manufacturer of
liability for a defective gas regulator.15 The court concluded that the
plaintiff had primarily assumed the risk of injury and was barred
from recovery. ' 6
This Note will argue that the Andren court incorrectly applied a
primary assumption of risk analysis in a factual setting that gave rise
to a secondary assumption of risk analysis. As a result, Andren re-
vived secondary assumption of risk as a complete defense to a manu-
facturer's established breach of duty. This Note concludes that the
appropriate analysis in products liability cases must focus on the
scope of the defendant's duty and only later address any defense
9. Id.
10. 1978 MINN. LAws 738.
11. Under the Comparative Fault Act,
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent or pri-
mary assumption of the risk, misuse of a product and unreasonable failure
to avoid an injury ....
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1990).
12. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1990).
13. 465 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
14. Id. at 104.
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based on the plaintiff's conduct. This analysis would promote the
underlying goals of the tort system. By first focusing on the product
manufacturer's duty, policy goals such as risk spreading and the de-
velopment of safe products will be advanced. Further, this method
of determining liability also precludes a plaintiff from bearing the
entire risk of loss where both parties are at fault.
II. HISTORY OF AsSUMPTION OF RISK
In its pure form, assumption of risk is based upon the English
common law notion that "to one who is willing no harm is done."1 7
Assumption of risk was prevalent at the turn of the century. During
this period of rapid economic growth, assumption of risk insulated
employers from liability for work-related injuries.18 At the time,
courts "reasoned that since workers were not forced to remain in any
given job, they voluntarily placed themselves in danger."t9
The relationship between employer and employee is based upon
contract principles.20 Unlike contributory negligence, which is based
upon an objective standard of reasonable conduct, assumption of
risk is measured subjectively.21 Thus, the court inquires into the
plaintiff's actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger posed by
the employer's negligence and the plaintiff's voluntary choice to as-
sume that risk.22 These elements are analogous to contract forma-
tion doctrines.23 Because the employee contemplated the risk of
injury in "return for a benefit, usually a particular wage rate," 24 he or
she was deemed to have consented to the employer's negligent con-
duct.25 The assumption of risk doctrine, however, often created
harsh and unfair results.26
17. Jane P. North, Comment, Employees'Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice,
52 TENN. L. REV. 35, 38 n.19 (1984) (translating English common law maxim, volenti
non fit injuria).
18. Id. at 40.
19. Id. (citations omitted); see also Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liabil-
ity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 875-76 (1982). "In theory, employees demanded, and
wage levels reflected, compensation commensurate with the extent of risk that em-
ployees knowingly assumed .... [Thus] potential accident costs were incorporated
into the wage rate." Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
20. See John H. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 L.A. L. REV. 17,




24. See Note, supra note 19, at 875.
25. See id. at 876. "The defense of assumption of risk thus manifested a judicial
unwillingness to shift losses when a benefit was conferred in exchange for a plaintiff's
consent to assume risk." Id. (citations omitted).
26. See Anderson v. H.C. Akelely Lumber Co., 47 Minn. 128, 49 N.W. 664
(1891). The employee in Anderson was injured when the belt on a planing machine
[Vol. 18
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In response, the assumption of risk defense was abolished from
the master-servant relationship as state workers' compensation laws
were enacted.27 Under these compensation laws, workers gave up
the right to sue employers at common law in exchange for the right,
regardless of fault, to receive compensation for work-related inju-
ries.28 Unable to sue employers, employees began to sue manufac-
turers for work-related injuries.29 As the number of products
liability cases grew, the assumption of risk defense once again be-
came popular as a means to limit a manufacturer's liability.SO
broke. The court acknowledged that the employer was negligent in failing to replace
or repair a worn belt. Id. at 129, 49 N.W. at 664. Even though the employee had
reported the worn belt to his foreman, the foreman, after examining the belt, in-
structed the employee to continue working. Shortly thereafter, the belt broke and
injured the employee. Id. at 128, 49 N.W. at 664. The court held that the employee
had assumed the risk of injury because it "does not appear that any necessity rested
upon him to proceed with the use of the machine." Id. at 129, 49 N.W. at 665. More-
over, the court inferred that the employee could have repaired the belt himself,
"although it was not within the general scope of his duty to repair belts in the mill."
Id. at 130, 49 N.W. at 665; see also Quick v. Minnesota Iron Co., 47 Minn. 361, 50
N.W. 244 (1891). Quick, a miner, was killed when he was struck by a lift cage while
crossing a horizontal shaft. The lift operated silently in a vertical shaft. Id. at 363, 50
N.W. at 244. While the employer had excavated a passageway around the vertical
shaft in other areas of the mine, the employer failed to provide safe passage around
this particular shaft. Id. at 362, 50 N.W. at 244. The court held that the employee
assumed the risk of being killed by continuing his employment with knowledge of the
risk. "Any one of common sense would know that if the cage should come down on
him while crossing the shaft it would injure, perhaps kill, him." Id. at 363, 50 N.W. at
244-45.
In response to these harsh results, the courts began to modify the assumption of
risk doctrine as applied to employment cases. In Greer v. Great N. Ry., 115 Minn.
213, 132 N.W. 6 (1911), the employee's arm was torn from its socket when his hand
became caught in an unguarded clutch gear. The district court instructed the jury
"that a person, in accepting employment, assumes the danger, usual risks, and perils
incident thereto, and also all the risks which he knows, or may in the exercise of
reasonable care know, to exist." Id. at 217, 132 N.W. at 7. However, the employee
did not assume "latent, unknown, or hidden defects, although arising from the
master's negligence." Id. at 217-18, 132 N.W. at 7. Even though the operation and
danger of the gear was apparent, the court found that the employee did not assume
the risk of injury because the "machine was complicated, and the danger not neces-
sarily apparent to the ordinary juror." Id. at 218, 132 N.W. at 8.
27. North, supra note 17, at 42-43.
28. Id. at 42.
29. Id. at 37. "Employers are generally insulated from employees' tort actions by
workers' compensation laws, and workers' compensation payments are generally con-
ceded to be minimal at best." Id. (citations omitted).
30. Manufacturers and distributors of defective products had traditionally re-
sorted to the concept of caveat emptor or lack of privity defense in order to limit their
liability. In the early years of products liability litigation, the country freely adopted
the notion of caveat emptor to reflect the risks of association with free enterprise and
the industrial revolution. See William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943); Note, Plaintiff's Conduct As a Defense to Claims
1992] 1145
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III. SCOPE OF THE MANUFACTURER'S DUTY
The number of products liability cases grew dramatically during
the 1960s and 1970s.31 In part, this was due to an expanding list of
potential theories a plaintiff could assert against a negligent manu-
facturer. Traditional theories of negligence were redefined to ex-
pand a manufacturer's duty, including liability for manufacturing
defects, design defects, and the failure to supply warnings and
instructions.32
In addition to tort theories, the Uniform Commercial Code ex-
panded the number of contract remedies by imposing liability for
express warranties,S3 the implied warranty of merchantability,34 and
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.3 5 Further,
the UCC eliminated the privity requirement, which prevented the
manufacturer from avoiding liability toward remote users and by-
standers injured by a defective product.36
Finally, the advent of strict liability, based upon section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, lessened the plaintiff's burden in
proving the existence of a defective product. In strict products liabil-
ity, the knowledge of the dangerous condition of the product is im-
puted to the defendant as a matter of law.3 7
Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809 (1986); see also FlemingJames,Jr.,
Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955) ("The citadel of privity has crumbled, and
today the ordinary tests of duty, negligence and liability are applied widely to the
man who supplies a chattel for the use of another.").
31. See generally 3 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILrrY, U.S. DEP'T.
OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY (1977). The
number of product liability cases reported in eight states doubled from 1965-70 to
1971-76. Id.
32. See generally Dennis J. Wall, Strict Liability and Negligence: The Distinguishable
Twins of Products Liability, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 319 (1985) (analyzing Florida products
liability law for negligence and strict liability claims).
33. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990).
34. Id. § 2-314.
35. Id. § 2-315.
36. See id. § 2-318; see, e.g., Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a remote user may sue for breach of warranties, despite
lack of privity with manufacturer).
37. A manufacturer is liable for physical harm to a consumer or user if the prod-
uct is sold in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1990). In strict liability the focus is on the defective
product, while in negligence the focus is on the manufacturer's conduct. Presuma-
bly, under strict liability the manufacturer is at fault for selling a defective product
even though he has "exercised all reasonable care in the preparation and sale of his
product." Id. at § 402A(2)(a).
Under strict liability there are two principal tests: the consumer expectations test
and the risk-utility balancing test. Under the consumer expectations test the court
balances the product expectations of an "ordinary consumer" with the knowledge of
the community in general. See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a
Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 306-14 (1967) (stating that concept is adopted
1146 [Vol. 18
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In response to the growing number of products liability cases,
manufacturers began to assert assumption of risk as an affirmative
defense.38 The defense was most often asserted by manufacturers in
cases based upon negligence since many jurisdictions were hesitant
to allow assumption of risk to relieve a defendant of liability in strict
products liability cases. 39
IV. THE ADOPTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES
In 1965, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts helped
establish assumption of risk as a defense to a strict products liability
action.40 The assumption of risk defense was allowed in strict liabil-
ity cases "[s]ince the liability with which this Section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability."41 The
Restatement defined assumption of risk as "the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceed-
from § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). In jurisdictions that apply a pure
consumer expectations test, the openness of the product defect precludes recovery in
most cases. See Paul D. Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?
22 Bus. LAw. 589, 593 (1967).
The second test for determining the existence of a defective product is based
upon a risk-utility balancing test. Minnesota has adopted the risk-utility balancing
test for design defects. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn.
1984). This test involves balancing "the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm
if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid
the harm." Id.
38. See Rusciano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 445 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that defense may be raised only when plaintiff has voluntarily
chosen to encounter a known and appreciated danger created by the negligence of
the defendant); Swagger v. City of Crystal, 379 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(distinguishing between primary assumption of risk, which is an affirmative defense
that bars plaintiff's recovery, and secondary assumption of risk which means that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence).
39. Because liability was strict, and not based upon fault, some states hold that
comparative fault principles do not apply in a strict liability case. See, e.g., Strang v.
Deere & Co., 796 S.W.2d 908, 914-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Other courts were hesi-
tant to allow the defense in failure to warn cases. See Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris
Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145, 163
n.59 (1955):
Though these time-honored defenses [contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk] are frequently invoked to defeat recovery, they are theoretically
inapplicable when the defendant's breach of duty is based on a failure to
warn. To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usu-
ally the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which he was igno-
rant or to have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of
reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed.
Id. at 163.
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ing to encounter a known danger."42 This definition of assumption
of risk offered little guidance to courts applying the doctrine.
The traditional elements of assumption of risk were subjectively
based. The Restatement, however, injected an objective standard: the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in proceeding to encounter
a known risk.43 A comment to section 402A provides, "If the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and never-
theless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is in-
jured by it, he is barred from recovery."44 Unfortunately, other
comments offer little guidance on the issue of whether a plaintiff who
reasonably assumes a risk and is injured should be barred from
recovery. 45
With little guidance, courts and commentators attempted to define
the role of the assumption of risk defense in products liability cases.
The result was a confusing and inconsistent array of results,46 defini-




45. At least one jurisdiction has emphasized the need to find that the plaintiff's
assumption of the risk was unreasonable. See Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d
132 (Or. 1976). The court inJohnson stated:
The reasonableness of any decision to encounter a known danger must de-
pend upon the circumstances surrounding that decision as well as on the
relative probability and gravity of the risk incurred. Whenever the jury at-
tempts to ascertain whether a plaintiff's decision to encounter a known risk
was reasonable, it will be necessary for them to consider the conditions
which motivated the decision, the pressures which were operating on the
plaintiff, and the amount of time which he had to make the decision.
Id. at 140.
46. See Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn. 1979) (hold-
ing that there was no assumption of risk where plaintiff manually unclogged corn
stalks in a forage harvester since the prior use of the machine had not made plaintiff
aware of the dangers of injury); see also Konovsky v. Kraus-Anderson, Inc., 306 Minn.
508, 237 N.W.2d 630 (1976) (finding no assumption of risk where plaintiff was not
"aware of the apparently more dangerous [ice] spots which were covered by the film
of water"). But see Geis v. Hodgman, 255 Minn. 1, 2, 95 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1959)
("Plaintiff had assumed the risks of falling when she voluntarily walked onto the
patch of ice which she admits she saw before she stepped on it.").
47. States have tended to blend and/or adopt one of the following definitions of
primary and secondary assumption of risk. Stephanie M. Wildman &John C. Barker,
Time to Abolish Implied Assumption of Risk in California, 25 S.F. L. REv. 647, 669-70
(1991) (citing Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE LJ. 141 (1952)). Pri-
mary assumption of risk was a legal conclusion that the defendant owed no duty to
protect the plaintiff from that type of harm. Id. Secondary assumption of risk was
characterized by the plaintiff's manifestation to voluntarily encounter a known risk.
Id. at 670; see also FlemingJames, Jr., Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
LJ. 185 (1968).
Prosser further divided primary assumption of risk into four categories. The first
category was express assumption of risk. In the second category, the plaintiff enters
1148 [Vol. 18
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V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN MINNESOTA
Like other states, assumption of risk involving defective products
in Minnesota was first described in the late 1800s and arose out of
the master-servant relationship.49 The general rule which emerged
from those early cases was that the plaintiff assumed risks that were
obvious and known but did not assume "latent, unknown, or hidden
defects."50 The underlying policy of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk was to encourage individuals to use ordinary care to
protect themselves from the risk of injury from an open and obvious
danger.51
While the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence were abolished in the master-servant relationship as workers'
compensation laws were enacted, these defenses remained popular
in tort actions. They were frequently cited in cases involving land-
into some relationship with the defendant which involves the risk. Typically these
cases involve sport participants, where the dangers inherent in the game are assumed
by the participant. In the third category, the plaintiff proceeds to voluntarily encoun-
ter a known risk, and even when this encounter with the risk is reasonable, the plain-
tiff's conduct is deemed consent to incur the risk. Finally, the plaintiff's conduct in
encountering a known risk is itself unreasonable, and amounts to contributory negli-
gence. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th
ed. 1984).
Keeton identified six different categories of assumption of risk in products liabil-
ity cases. The different categories were based upon the degree of consent the plain-
tiff manifested, whether express, implied or imposed as a matter of law from the
circumstances of the case. See Products Liability, supra note 2, at 123-30.
States have adopted various bits and pieces from these three main categories.
For example, in California, assumption of risk has been abolished as a separate de-
fense, at least to the extent that it is a variant of contributory negligence. Wildman &
Barker, supra, at 647. The plaintiff is barred from recovery if he assumed a risk that is
reasonable under the circumstances, but is allowed to recover if he assumes an un-
reasonable risk of injury. Commentators have argued for abolishing this distinction
and have urged that assumption of risk, reasonable and unreasonable, be appor-
tioned under the comparative fault scheme. Id. at 671-72.
48. See, e.g., East Penn Mfg. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1119-22 (D.C. 1990) (de-
nying application of experienced user exception where mechanic lacked requisite
knowledge of specific risks associated with charging a truck's battery); Keller v.
Vermeer Mfg., 360 N.W.2d 502, 504-06 (N.D. 1984) (finding plaintiff's "momentary
forgetfulness" of known and appreciated hazard from mechanical baler a defense to
contributory negligence in product liability cases); see also Kenneth M. Willner, Note,
Failures to Warn and The Sophisticated User Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 587 (1988) ("The
sophisticated user defense relieves a seller of liability for failing to warn a subsequent
user of dangers or defects of which the user is already aware.").
49. See, e.g., Lally v. Crookston Lumber Co., 82 Minn. 407, 85 N.W. 157 (1901).
The court held that an employee assumed the risk of injury despite the fact that his
employer failed to provide an adequate guard for a saw. Id.
50. Greer v. Great N. Ry., 115 Minn. 213, 218, 132 N.W. 6, 7 (1911).
51. See, e.g., Muckler v. Buchl, 276 Minn. 490, 499, 150 N.W.2d 689, 695 (1967)
("The law imposes a duty on every person to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety and if he fails to do so he is said to be contributorily negligent.").
19921 1149
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owners, 5 2 automobiles,53 sports participants,54 and other cases. 5 5
Before 1971, a finding of either contributory negligence or assump-
tion of risk was a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery. 56 Thus, a
fine distinction between the two defenses was unnecessary.57
52. See, e.g., Betzold v. Sherwin, 404 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
no assumption of risk where guest failed to turn on light while walking in house at
night and suffered injury in an open stairwell); see also Rieger v. Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d
16 (Minn. 1982) (finding no assumption of risk when spectator leaped infield fence
during nonrace period at a racetrack); Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177 (Minn.
1979) (holding that plaintiff had assumed the risk of slipping and falling on icy side-
walk of store); Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 232 N.W.2d 818 (1975) (finding no
assumption of risk for invitees on church property where church had undertaken duty
to make an inspection of the property for dangerous conditions).
53. See, e.g., Meulners v. Hawkes, 299 Minn. 76, 216 N.W.2d 633 (1974) (holding
no assumption of risk where plaintiff had no knowledge that car was approaching as
she stood in street); Thompson v. Hill, 366 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding primary assumption of risk did not apply because driver of car owed passen-
ger duty of reasonable care while driving on river ice).
54. See, e.g., Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 216 N.W.2d 124 (1974) (holding
primary assumption of risk not applicable where driver of snowmobile owed duty to
passenger); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587 (1966) (finding plain-
tiff assumed risk of falls and collisions with other ice skaters brought about by her
own or other skaters' lack of skill); Hollinbeck v. Downey, 261 Minn. 481, 113
N.W.2d 9 (1962) (holding that golfer had duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
injuring another by driven ball; caddy did not assume risk of injury from ball where
no warning was given); see also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Liability of Participant
in Team Athletic Competitionfor Injury to or Death of Another Participant, 77 A.L.R.3n 1300
(1977).
55. See Ganser v. Erickson, 279 Minn. 235, 238, 156 N.W.2d 224, 226 (1968)
(holding that where a minor was hit in the eye by an acorn fired from a friend's
slingshot, he had assumed the risk of injury; "To stand in the general line of fire and
to do so where the partner is using a weapon and projectile of inherent inaccuracy is
specifically to court disaster."); Hassler v. Simon, 466 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (finding no primary assumption of risk where defendant owed participant in
"wild cow milking contest" a duty to protect plaintiff from the dangerous propensi-
ties of a bolting black angus cow).
56. See, e.g., Guy v. Western Newspaper Union, 236 Minn. 20, 55 N.W.2d 298
(1952) (holding that since plaintiff was contributorily negligent, he could not recover
damages from defendant).
57. The definitions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were often
blended together. See, e.g., Parness v. Economics Lab., Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170
N.W.2d 554 (1969). In Parness, an employee was injured when she slipped and fell in
a puddle of soapy water in the kitchen of the cafe where she worked. In upholding
the jury verdict for the employee, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
The jury could have justifiably concluded that Mrs. Parness failed to exercise
reasonable care in deciding to attempt to walk across the water-covered
floor as well as that, after having made the decision to do so, she failed to
use reasonable care in the method by which she proceeded. .. . In addition,
even if Mrs. Parness' decision to proceed was not a departure from reason-
able conduct, the jury could have found, as plaintiffs appear to concede, that
she was contributorily negligent in walking unaided, as she did, or in failing
to guard against a fall by availing herself of the support of the arm of her
coworker, the dishwasher, or some of the other equipment in the kitchen.
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Typically, assumption of risk involved an individual's knowledge
and appreciation of a specific risk of injury and a willingness to en-
counter that risk, 58 whereas contributory negligence involved a de-
parture from the standard of reasonable conduct required under the
circumstances.59 Whatever label was attached, assumption of risk
and contributory negligence both involved a weighing of the plain-
tiff's knowledge, whether imputed or actual, with a reasonable per-
son standard of conduct.
In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished the distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence.6 0 The
supreme court acknowledged "the emerging concept that an injured
plaintiff's involuntary or otherwise not unreasonable assumption of
risk should not exonerate a defendant from his causal negligence." 61
Assumption of risk would now be considered just a "phase of con-
tributory negligence."62 While these changes were consistent with
the adoption of the comparative negligence statute, the court re-
tained the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of
risk.
A. Primary Assumption of Risk
Primary assumption of risk falls into two categories: express and
implied. Express primary assumption of risk is based upon contract
principles and generally occurs when the plaintiff expressly agrees to
Id. at 384, 170 N.W.2d at 556-57; see also Haessly v. Lotzer, 309 Minn. 498, 245
N.W.2d 841 (1976). In Haessly, the court held that the decedent was negligent in
climbing a poorly maintained stairway. However, the court held that a plaintiff can-
not assume the risk absent a conscious awareness and voluntary risk of the hazards.
Id. at 502, 245 N.W.2d at 844.
58. To avoid the sometimes harsh results of the assumption of risk doctrine,
courts began to require the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was fully aware of
the nature and degree of risk. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc.,
442 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). In Johnson, an employee was injured while
performing freehand cutting on a power table saw. Id. at 845. The manufacturer had
provided a warning against freehand cutting because no mechanical guide is used to
move the wood through the cutting blades. Id. at 845-46. The manufacturer argued
that the employee had primarily assumed the risk of injury because he knew the dan-
gers of freehand cutting. The court found that he "did not comprehend 'how or in
what manner, or the number of ways, that his hand could come into contact with the
blade.'" Id. at 848; see also Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 147 N.W.2d
561 (1966). Knutson held that a workman did not assume the risk of falling when he
tested the terrazano mud and honestly believed it was solid to the floor. Id. at 414,
147 N.W.2d at 566.
59. See supra note 46.
60. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 25, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
61. Id.
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relieve the defendant of a duty of care.63 Implied primary assump-
tion of risk, on the other hand, relates to whether the defendant has
a duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm.64 This principle
can be expressed in two different ways. In the first form of implied
primary assumption of risk, the defendant owes no duty to protect the
plaintiff from the risk which resulted in the harm.65 In the second
form, the defendant owes a limited duty of care to the plaintiff with
respect to certain risks incident to their relationship. 66
1. No Duty Analysis
The first form of primary assumption of risk is illustrated by Rausch
v. Julius B. Nelson & Sons.67 There, the plaintiff was an electrician
working for a subcontractor installing electrical wiring for a con-
struction project. Another subcontractor had the task of staining
doors before installing them on the job site. After each door was
stained, it was placed upright with a top corner touching the wall.68
When the electrician arrived, he decided to feed wires from one elec-
trical box to another in the room where the doors were stacked. 69
The electrician removed two doors which were immediately in front
of the electrical box.70 He then went into the space between the
doors and began to feed wire into the wall. 7 1 A second worker was
stationed just beyond the stack of doors and waited to pull the wire
63. See, e.g., Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727,
731 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an exculpatory agreement that released
skydiving club from liability for acts of negligence was enforceable).
64. See Springrose, 292 Minn. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827; see also Bakhos v. Driver,
275 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 1979). In Bakhos, the plaintiff fell from a tree when his co-
worker negligently pulled the limb the plaintiff was sawing. The plaintiff did not
assume the risk since he did not choose to expose himself to the actions of his co-
worker. Id. at 595.
65. See, e.g., Erickson v. Van Web Equip. Co., 270 Minn. 42, 132 N.W.2d 814
(1964). In Erickson, a farmer was injured when his hand was caught under the cable
of a hydraulicjack. In the process of unloading corn from a hydraulic lift, the piston
began to bind in the cylinder, and momentarily stopped the box from rising. As the
farmer leaned over to examine the piston, it suddenly released, trapping his hand.
Id. at 44-45, 132 N.W.2d at 817. The court found that the defendant had no prior
knowledge of the hydraulic lift binding and thus had no duty to warn the farmer. See
id. at 50-51, 132 N.W.2d at 820-21. The court held that the farmer "alone was solely
responsible [for his injuries] and that his contributory fault and assumption of risk
appear as a matter of law." Id. at 52, 132 N.W.2d at 821.
66. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
67. 276 Minn. 12, 149 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
68. Id. at 14, 149 N.W.2d at 3. A space of about eight inches was left between
each door to facilitate the drying of the stain.
69. Id. at 14-15, 149 N.W.2d at 4. Even though the plaintiff could have waited
until the next day when the doors would be removed, he decided to go ahead and
work in the midst of the stacked doors.
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out of the wall and through the electrical box on his side.72 After
about ten feet of the wire had been fed, the door adjacent to the
second worker began to fall, striking the door next to it, and so on, in
a domino fashion, with the result that some forty-three doors fell.
7 3
The electrician was struck by the last door that fell and was killed
instantly. 74
The electrician alleged that the defendant contractor had a duty to
supervise the work and control the acts of the subcontractors. The
court, however, found that the defendant did not have general su-
pervision over the work of the subcontractors. The various subcon-
tractors were responsible for the methods and procedures used in
completing their work. Thus, the defendant had no duty to super-
vise or control the way in which the work was completed.75
On the issue of duty, the court stated that it was "practically im-
possible to conceive of anything anyone could have told the dece-
dent about either the situation or the risks incident to it which would
not have been patent to the senses in the exercise of common obser-
vation by a man of his intelligence and long experience."76 In the
absence of a duty on the part of the defendant, the court held that
the plaintiff had primarily assumed the risk of injury.77
This case illustrates the principle that primary assumption of risk
may arise in cases where there is no duty to protect the plaintiff from
the way in which the harm arose. The defendant had no duty to su-
pervise or direct how the work would be done. Thus, the plaintiff
had assumed the risk of injury resulting from his own voluntary
choice to proceed in the manner in which he did. In other words, the
defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the accident. 78
2. Limited Duty Analysis




75. See id. at 20-21, 149 N.W.2d at 7.
76. Id. at 21, 149 N.W.2d at 7.
77. Id. at 21, 149 N.W.2d at 8.
78. Id. at 21-22, 149 N.W.2d at 8;see also Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395
N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986). In Smithe, the court described the relationship between
duty and causation as follows:
In determining whether the duty exists, the court goes to the event causing
the damage and looks back to the alleged negligent act. If the connection is
too remote to impose liability as a matter of public policy, the courts then
hold there is no duty, and consequently no liability. On the other hand, if
the consequence is direct and is the type of occurrence that was or should
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where the defendant has a limited duty of care. Generally, everyone
owes a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring others.79 Under
some circumstances, however, one may implicitly agree to relieve an-
other of his or her duty of care. For example, there may be circum-
stances under which consent to relieve another of the duty of care is
sufficiently manifested by conduct. In these cases, implied primary
assumption of risk is used to express the notion that, with respect to
certain well known and incidental risks attendant to an activity or
relationship, the defendant owes a limited duty of care.
A prime example of the limited duty analysis is found in sports
participant cases. The decision to participate in a sporting event car-
ries well-known and incidental risks of injury, such as being injured
during a football tackle. In order for the game to proceed, the play-
ers have implicitly consented to the risk of injury. Another way of
expressing this concept is that other players owe no duty to protect
an individual from a miscalculated tackle or other risk of injury inci-
dent to the sport.80
The law, however, does not assume that an individual consents to
risks beyond those contemplated by a reasonable sports partici-
pant.8' It is consent to encounter the known and obvious risks of
injury incident to the activity that the plaintiff is deemed to assume,
and not the defendant's otherwise reckless82 or intentional con-
duct.8 3 The plaintiff's subjective consent to incur these risks is mani-
fested by his or her voluntary choice to play the sport. Once courts
move beyond the context of sporting events, however, the presump-
tions operating in implied primary assumption of risk may not be
appropriate.
79. See, e.g., Rue v. Wendland, 226 Minn. 449, 453, 33 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1948)
(proposing that a person be required to "exercise his senses" not only for the protec-
tion of himself, but also for the protection of others).
80. See supra note 54. In addition to sport participants, spectators are generally
held to assume risks incident to viewing a sport. See, e.g., Grisim v. Tapemark Charity
Pro-Am Golf Tournament, 415 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Minn. 1987) (holding that an ama-
teur golfer had no duty to warn spectator prior to teeing off); Swagger v. City of
Crystal, 379 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a patron at a base-
ball game assumes the risk of injury from thrown or batted balls when they sit in an
unprotected area).
81. See, e.g., Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enter., 396 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Minn.
1986) (holding that the negligent maintenance and supervision of a rollerskating rink
is not an inherent risk of the sport itself).
82. See, e.g., Seidl v. Trollhaugen, Inc., 305 Minn. 506, 509, 232 N.W.2d 236,
240-41 (1975) (holding that being accidentally hit by ski instructors while skiing is
not an inherent risk of the sport); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 451, 147 N.W.2d
587, 589 (1966) ("The conduct of other skaters may be so reckless or inept as to be
wholly unanticipated.").
83. See generally David J. Stephenson, Competitive Sports Torts, 19 COLO. LAw. 2457
(1990) (discussing liability for intentional and reckless conduct in sports).
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The mere fact that an individual has undertaken a volitional act is
not sufficient by itself to demonstrate that the act was truly volun-
tary.8 4 In the case of defective products, for example, one who has
no choice but to use a product that presents an unreasonable risk of
injury in order to obtain its advertised benefits, is not making the
same kind of voluntary choice as participants in a sporting event.8 5
In sport participant cases, the player's objective and subjective
consent to incur the risk is manifested by the willingness to play the
game. Presumably, one may forgo the opportunity to play the game
and avoid the risk of injury altogether. Likewise, a plaintiff injured
by a defective product arguably could have chosen to avoid the risk
of injury altogether by deciding not to purchase the product. But
this reasoning ignores the marketing forces behind a manufacturer's
product as well as the public policy that imposes the duty on product
manufacturers to make safe products.86 Moreover, while a sports
84. See Products Liability, supra note 2, at 133. Keeton differentiates assumption of
risk by consensual elements and categories of assumption of risk. His categories
ranged from express consent, the first form, to imposed assumption of risk, a legal
conclusion that the defendant did not owe a duty of care toward the plaintiff. Id. at
123-30. "[T]he doctrine of assumption of risk continues to commend itself if (a) it is
limited to cases in which either objectively consensual assumption of risk or an even
more consensual form can be proved and (b) it is duly qualified to exclude cases of
duress." Id. at 152-53.
The voluntariness of the plaintiff's conduct has been an important theme in Min-
nesota cases applying the assumption of risk doctrine. See Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh
Co., 274 Minn. 495, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966). "Where the dilemma is created by
defendant's tortious conduct, a plaintiff is not necessarily guilty of assuming a risk
encountered under compulsion which leaves him with no reasonable alternatives."
Id. at 498, 144 N.W.2d at 558-59.
85. See Products Liability, supra note 2, at 143.
The crucial fact, under this form of the doctrine [of objectively manifested
consent to risk] is that the plaintiff has manifested that his state of mind is
one of full appreciation of the risk and willingness to encounter it .... On
the other hand, the fact that the risk is one he should appreciate does not
establish either contributory negligence (since it may happen that his en-
countering the known risk is reasonable) or consent to risk (since it may
happen that he neither manifests nor secretly holds the state of mind of full
appreciation and willingness to encounter the risk). Similarly, the fact the
risk is "obvious" falls short of establishing plaintiff's consent to risk, unless
"obvious" means that the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could
make [a different finding].
Id.
86. See John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Admin-
istration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803 (1976). The
authors suggest the following policy reasons for imposing strict liability on product
manufacturers:
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product qual-
ity through the use of mass advertising and merchandising practices, caus-
ing consumers to rely for their protection upon the skill and expertise of the
manufacturing community.
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves ade-
quately from defective products due to the vast number and complexity of
1992] 1155
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participant can readily anticipate and protect against the risk of in-
jury during a game, a product consumer may be unable to anticipate
the nature and seriousness of the risk or take adequate precautions
to guard against product hazards. Other factors also distinguish the
relationship between the product manufacturer, the consumer, and
the sport participant in primary assumption of risk cases.
a. The Nature of the Defendant's Conduct
Cases that justify a plaintiff's liability based on the plaintiff's vol-
untary choice to assume risk unfairly ignore the defendant's volun-
tary conduct. The manufacturer has also made a "conscious choice
to sell products with certain calculable risks and inevitable accidents
costs." 8 7 Thus, a manufacturer's "choice" to impose a risk cannot
be given less weight than a plaintiff's choice to assume a risk.88 Un-
like the plaintiff in sport participant cases, the plaintiff in products
liability cases may have little choice to forgo the product's benefits
without incurring the added risk.89
b. The Relationship Between the Plaintiff and Defendant
Another distinction lies in the historical development of the as-
sumption of risk doctrine from contract law to employment law. For
example, the modem development of assumption of risk theory
products which must be "consumed" in order to function in modem soci-
ety.
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to identify the
potential product risks, to determine the acceptable levels of such risks, and
to confine the risks within those levels.
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse are
probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of manufacturers
... or marketing process, yet the difficulties of discovering and proving this
negligence are often practicably insurmountable.
(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers to
absorb or spread the costs of product accidents.
Id. at 809.
87. Note, supra note 19, at 888-89. The concept of fault runs throughout product
liability law. In strict liability cases, the manufacturer's fault stems from failure to
discover the defect before placing the product on the market. In negligence cases,
the manufacturer's fault is based upon the failure to detect manufacturing flaws,
place adequate warnings to protect potential users, and the failure to use reasonable
care in designing the product. Further,
If both the plaintiff's and the defendant's conscious choices are responsible
for the resulting injury and if the relative quality of the knowledge that each
possesses to inform his choice is not relevant to the application of the as-
sumption of risk defense, it is hard to see why the plaintiff's choice to as-
sume the risk is weightier in fairness terms than the defendant's choice to
impose it.
Id. at 889 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. See supra note 82.
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arose out of the employment context and reflected certain economic
notions about the willingness of employees to trade a wage in ex-
change for certain well-known and incidental risks of injury attend-
ant to their employment.90 This bargain-based justification for
assumption of risk is not appropriate when applied in modern day
products liability cases. Frequently, the consumer has no way to dis-
cover the magnitude of the risk before the product is purchased.9 '
Furthermore, if a risk is later discovered, the consumer cannot rene-
gotiate the price of the product.9 2
c. Manufacturer Is in the Best Position to Control Product Risks
The risk of injury from a defective product is more easily mini-
mized by the product manufacturer. A legal rule which requires
product manufacturers to pay for the social costs of injuries proxi-
mately caused by their defective products is both economically rea-
sonable and conducive to public policy.9a Thus, implied primary
assumption of risk in products liability cases may inefficiently shift
90. See Note, supra note 19, at 880.
91. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in early cases, used assumption of risk ele-
ments to bar a plaintiff's recovery, despite the fact that the product defect was not
obvious until the product was used. In Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., 285 Minn. 32, 171
N.W.2d 201 (1969), the plaintiff was injured by an exposed sparkplug on a snowmo-
bile. The sparkplug was located near the position of the rider's knee during opera-
tion of the machine. In one of the first cases to discuss the application of strict
liability, the court stated that in strict product liability cases, under § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the "awareness" of the defect was a factor in determining
whether the product was in a dangerous condition beyond the "normal public expec-
tation of the danger." Id. at 39-40, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
The fact that the plaintiff was aware of the location of the sparkplug and that
"[h]e knew the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness . . . not only
negat[es] any claim of defect, but certainly takes this snowmobile out of the category
of being unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 42, 171 N.W.2d at 208. These elements
are analogous to those found in the assumption of risk defense.
92. See Note, supra note 19, at 880.
[T]he assumption of risk defense could only be justified by the trading-over-
risk rationale if the law were to focus on the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk
at the time he bought the product. Under strict products liability, however,
the crucial legal inquiry is whether the plaintiff knew of the danger at the time
of his injury.
Id.
93. In addition to public policy considerations for imposing liability on product
manufacturers, at least one author has suggested an economic approach. See Richard
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-36 (1972). In discussing
Learned Hand's formula for negligence (i.e. liability depends on whether the burden
or cost of precautions to avoid the injury is less than the probability of the injury
occurring times the severity of the injury), Posner suggests, "If the cost of safety
measures or of curtailment-whichever cost is lower-exceeds the benefit in accident
avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in eco-
nomic terms, to forgo accident prevention." Id. at 32.
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accident costs from the manufacturer to the plaintiff.94 In contrast,
secondary assumption of risk, like contributory negligence, more ac-
curately reflects the goals and incentives of the tort system in allocat-
ing the risk of loss in products liability cases.9 5
B. Secondary Assumption of Risk
Secondary assumption of risk is the better reasoned approach in
products liability cases for several reasons. First, under a pure com-
parative fault scheme,96 secondary assumption of risk, like contribu-
tory negligence, provides efficient incentives for manufacturers and
consumers to reduce accident costs. When precaution for reducing
the likelihood and severity of an accident is bilateral-that is, both
parties can take precautions to reduce the probability of an acci-
dent-secondary assumption of risk encourages manufacturers to re-
duce product-related harms and consumers to use due care.97
94. See Note, supra note 19, at 882-87. The author undertakes an economic effi-
ciency analysis of the assumption of risk defense and concludes that implied primary
assumption of risk creates inefficient incentives for product manufacturers to reduce
accident costs. See also Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). In Bilotta,
the manufacturer urged the court to adopt a rule where a manufacturer's offer of
saftey devices shifts risk of loss to the purchaser if the purchaser chooses to use the
product without safety devices. The manufacturer argued this rule would encourage
the purchase of safety devices. Id. at 624. The court rejected this risk shifting ap-
proach and held that a manufacturer may not "delegate its duty to design a reason-
ably safe product." Id.; see also Johnson v. Southern Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc., 442
N.W.2d 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (faulting manufacturer for not attaching safety
guard where it was foreseeable that plaintiff would attempt freehand cutting with the
saw).
95. See Note, supra note 19, at 884. The author argues that assumption of risk is
"inefficient as a method of inducing cost-justified behavior by the plaintiff because, in
determining whether to bar recovery, the defense in its classical form does not con-
sider the plaintiff's level of care." Id. The author concludes that "the objective of
inducing due care would be achieved more efficiently by the contributory negligence
defense." Id. Minnesota has adopted a similar approach through its contributory
fault statutes. See MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1990). Minnesota's approach suggests
that a claimant's voluntary and unreasonable use of a product with a known defect or
condition merely reduces the claimant's damages, instead of totally barring a recov-
ery. See also Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,714 (1979).
96. Under a pure comparative fault scheme, the parties share the damages in
proportion that their negligence contributed to the accident. In Minnesota, the
plaintiff is barred from recovery if his or her share of the fault is 51% or greater than
the defendant's. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (Supp. 1992).
97. In economic terms, this is called the moral hazard problem. This problem
arises when the behavior of an individual changes after the purchase of insurance so
that the probability of a loss increases. The availability of insurance creates an ad-
verse incentive on the part of the plaintiff to shift the risk of loss onto the insurer.
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 65-66 (1988).
This same problem, in theory, applies to product manufacturers and consumers.
Under strict liability, the manufacturer provides insurance to consumers for injuries
proximately caused by a defective product, regardless of the manufacturer's fault. In
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Second, secondary assumption of risk is an affirmative defense to
an established breach of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.
By focusing on the duty analysis first, the court may avoid the ten-
dency to place greater emphasis on the plaintiff's conduct, merely
because his or her conduct occurred later in time than the
defendant's.98
Minnesota courts that focus on the plaintiff's conduct first have a
tendency to place the responsibility for risk avoidance on the plain-
tiff.99 This method of analysis is analogous to the "last clear chance"
doctrine. 1oo Similarly, assumption of risk is a risk avoidance rule that
shifts the accident cost from the defendant to the plaintiff, depend-
ing on which "party was in a better position to make the cost-benefit
analysis, irrespective of the other's negligence."10, Thus, assump-
tion of risk, like the last clear chance doctrine, is a legal conclusion
which does little to explain why one party should bear the accident
reality, however, efficient incentives exist for product users regardless of the nature
of the defendant's liability. The economic norm of a consumer is that of the risk-
adverse person whose conduct is governed more by the possibility of a serious injury
from a product than the possibility of receiving compensation from a product manu-
facturer. Most would agree that monetary compensation cannot adequately replace a
missing limb, lost as a result of a defective product. Thus, secondary assumption of
risk provides efficient incentives for consumers to use due care when using products
that present some risk of injury without the need to shift the entire risk of loss on the
product user. See infra note 117.
98. See, e.g., Schroeder v.Jesco, Inc., 296 Minn. 447, 209 N.W.2d 414 (1973). In
Schroeder, the plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured by falling lumber acciden-
tally knocked down the stairwell by another worker. Because there was an alternative
stairwell that the plaintiff could have taken, the court held that he assumed the risk of
injury by voluntarily exposing himself to the risk of falling timber. Id. at 453, 209
N.W.2d at 419. "It is inconceivable that reasonable men would have to conclude
that, plaintiff, an experienced construction worker who knew that timber would
sometimes be dropped from one floor to another at construction sites, did not know
and appreciate the risk of falling objects inherent in working under construction in
progress." Id. at 452, 209 N.W.2d at 418. In essence, the court held that the plaintiff
voluntarily consented to be injured by the negligence of the other employee merely
because he was aware of the potential for falling timber and did not take an alterna-
tive route. The court did not address the duty of reasonable care which the other
workers owed the plaintiff.
99. See Tews v. Husqvarna, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In
selecting a chain saw without a chain brake, the plaintiff in Tews primarily assumed
the risk. The court did not discuss the defendant's duty to incorporate known safety
features.
100. See Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE LJ.
704, 704 (1938). The last clear chance doctrine stated the rule that a plaintiff, though
negligent, could recover from a defendant who had the last clear chance to avoid
injuring him. "When an accident happens through the combined negligence of two
persons, he alone is liable to the other who had the last opportunity of avoiding the
accident by reasonable care." Id. at 708 (citation omitted).
101. Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1065 (1972).
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costs irrespective of the other party's negligence.102 In contrast,
courts that examine the manufacturer's duty first must explain why
the defendant's duty did not encompass that particular risk of
injury.' 03
Finally, the duty analysis under secondary assumption of risk al-
lows the court to compare the nature of the plaintiff's duty with the
nature of the defendant's duty. In some cases, the duty of the manu-
facturer may not be relieved by the plaintiff's subsequent con-
duct.104 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Machinery,10 5 held that workers injured while doing
their assigned work cannot be found to have assumed the risk. The
court stated, "The imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to make
the machine safe to operate.., means that the law does not accept
the employee's ability to take care of himself as an adequate safe-
guard of interests which society seeks to protect." 06
Other courts have followed this reasoning and limited the use of
assumption of risk defenses in the employment context. 07 While
Minnesota has not expressly adopted this view, recent decisions have
indicated a willingness to consider voluntariness in the employment
context.' 08 Outside of the employment context, the knowledge and
102. From an economic perspective, assumption of risk in cases involving defec-
tive products is often "justified under modem theories as a method of permitting
consumers to trade on their preferences for risk: in exchange for lower prices .... "
Note, supra note 19, at 877. However, in the product context, the consumer often
does not discover the risk until after the product is purchased. In the early assump-
tion of risk cases, "the continuing nature of the employment relationship made it
possible to argue that an employee's continued willingness to work after discovering
the ... risk constituted a contractual acceptance of the danger-a bargain that tort
law should not upset." Id. at 880. This same justification is not supported in modem
product liability cases.
103. See supra notes 46-48.
104. The use of assumption of risk in the employment context has often been
supported by an economic efficiency argument.
The theory is that risk avoidance is enhanced if workers know that they must
bear the economic brunt of workplace injury. This proposition is not
founded in workplace reality .... Psychologically, a worker does not face
the daily demands of a job undergirded by the comfort of knowing that a
jury may compensate him or her years later for a disabling injury. For most,
the risk avoidance instinct is predicated on the avoidance of pain rather than
cost. That accidents still frequently occur, despite an almost universal aver-
sion to pain, shows that the risk avoidance argument for denying recovery
has little logical basis.
North, supra note 17, at 48 (citation omitted).
105. 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979).
106. Id. at 148.
107. See, e.g., Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that
worker did not assume risk of injury from roof bolting machine); McCalla v. Har-
nischfeger Corp., 521 A.2d 851 (NJ. 1987) (holding that worker's welding activity in
location required by employer exception to assumption of risk).
108. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624-25 (Minn. 1984) (holding
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voluntariness aspects of the assumption of risk defense have proven
to be difficult to apply, particularly in products liability cases.' 09
VI. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK
DEFENSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
The rationale underlying secondary assumption of risk is often
stated in terms of "consent" to relieve the defendant of an estab-
lished duty of care."10 The term "consent" in assumption of risk
cases is loosely related to contract notions of mutual assent. Notice-
ably lacking, however, are the benefits of mutual negotiation over
terms routinely present under contract law."l' The supposed pro-
that manufacturer has duty to install safety equipment and the manufacturer may not
"leave safety to the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser"); Johnson v.
Southern Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc., 442 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (hold-
ing that where worker was injured while misusing a saw in the manner instructed by
his foreman, the worker did not primarily assume risk of injury).
109. See, e.g., Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 479 (S.D.
Ind. 1988). In Rinehart, the court refused to grant summary judgment on the issue of
assumption of risk where a plaintiff was aware of the risk of toxic shock. The court
stated:
[D]efendants offer no explanation of what was unreasonable about plain-
tiff's subsequent use of the product, unless defendants mean to imply that
after having read the warning, it was unreasonable for plaintiff to use de-
fendants' tampons at all. If so, one wonders as to the reasonableness of de-
fendants in advertising and selling such a product.
Id. at 479.
110. In the typical consent or assumption of risk situation, the plaintiff is
presented with three choices: 1) not engaging in the activity, and not obtaining the
benefit; 2) engaging in the activity and encountering a tortiously created risk, and
also obtaining a benefit; 3) engaging in the activity and not encountering that risk,
and also obtaining the benefit. Assumption of the risk should only operate when the
plaintiff is presented with the third option. Kenneth Simons, Assumption of Risk and
Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 220 (1987).
Nevertheless, many courts ignore the plaintiff's preferred choice to purchase a
product without the risk of injury. In Tews v. Husqvarna, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 363
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the consumer was injured when the chain saw he was using
kicked back, connecting with his arm. The consumer alleged that the saw was defec-
tive since it did not have a chain brake. At the time the consumer purchased the
product no chain brake was available for this particular model. The court held that
the consumer had primarily assumed the risk of injury by selecting a model without a
chain brake. Id. at 368. However, the court never discussed whether the nature of
the risk was foreseeable by the product manufacturer or whether the manufacturer
had a duty to design a chain saw with a brake.
111. See generally John Diamond, Assumption of Risk After Comparative Negligence: Inte-
grating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 717 (1991). The author
argues:
Contract principles rely on individual negotiations in the marketplace and
enforce actual promises. It is obviously inappropriate to make up an agree-
ment that did not exist in fact and to justify enforcement because there was
an "agreement." It also seems dangerous to manipulate contract law by
enforcing a perceived implied contract when basic contract law would be
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tections under assumption of risk are related to the detailed require-
ments of the doctrine.
In Minnesota, the defendant has the burden to show that the plain-
tiff (1) had knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the nature and de-
gree of the risk, and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter the risk.112
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is deemed to have consented
to a tortiously created risk, thereby relieving the defendant of liabil-
ity. 113 This presumes that the elements of assumption of risk are
sufficient to justify risk shifting regardless of fairness or other consid-
erations, such as the defendant's ability to control the risk.' 14 In the
case of a defective product, the defendant may be in the best position
to avoid the risk of injury.ll5 Moreover, the plaintiff may not have
made an informed or truly voluntary choice to incur the added risk in
order to receive the product's benefits,l16 yet the plaintiff will be
deemed to have assumed these risks.' 17
unwilling to enforce the implied agreement for lack of compliance with the
statute of frauds, or some other contract doctrine.
Id. at 747.
112. See, e.g., Evanson v. Jerowski, 308 Minn. 113, 118, 241 N.W.2d 636, 640
(1976).
113. The application of implied assumption of risk may be justified under contract
notions of consent, i.e., sport participant cases and also the so-called "fireman's"
rule. See Diamond, supra note 111, at 743.
A professional may, for example, be compensated in advance for the risk of
encountering negligently created hazards. A legal doctrine that discourages
reasoned and bargained for exchanges disrupts a market attempting to effi-
ciently control those risks. There is little value in discouraging the employ-
ment of professionals to contain and limit the dangers from prior
negligence. Similarly, the right to attend or participate in an athletic event
can involve a bargained for reduction in the standard of care expected by
participants. In theory, the reduction in protection is exchanged for a re-
duced cost of participation.
Id. at 746.
114. See, e.g., Fick v. Wolfinger, 293 Minn. 483, 198 N.W.2d 146 (1972) (holding
that a farmhand injured by a power takeoff on a tractor did not assume the risk, even
though he was aware of the risk of the unsafe machinery, because the employer had
duty to protect the servant from danger).
115. See Products Liability, supra note 2, at 152. "If capacity to bear and distribute
risk were substituted for fault as the basis for liability in tort law, assumption of risk
would lose nearly all its power to command a following." Id.
116. The necessity of a voluntary assumption of risk is supported by § 496E(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(2) The plaintiff's acceptance of a risk in not voluntary if the defendant's
tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in
order to
(a) avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has
no right to deprive him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 462E(2) (1965).
117. In traditional assumption of risk situations, those not involving a defective
product, the plaintiff is presented with only two choices. The plaintiff can chose to
proceed in the face of the risk, or the plaintiff can chose an alternative course of
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In part, the continuing viability of the assumption of risk doctrine
lies in the historical tenets of our fault-based tort system. First, it is
difficult to ignore the plaintiff's own conduct in causing his or her
injuries. In contributory negligence cases, the knowledge and un-
derstanding of a fictitious reasonable person is imputed to the plain-
tiff. Thus, his or her conduct appears less culpable than that of the
plaintiff in assumption of risk cases.
In assumption of risk cases, the plaintiff is aware of the risk of in-
jury and presumably weighed the utility of encountering the risk in
order to achieve some benefit from the activity or product. Courts
are hesitant to shift the risk of injury from a plaintiff, who presuma-
bly could have avoided the risk of injury, to a defendant whose liabil-
ity is based upon strict liability or expanded duty notions, which
impose liability for all foreseeable risks arising from the defendant's
negligent conduct.
Another reason courts are hesitant to shift the risk of loss from a
plaintiff to a defendant is the voluntariness of the plaintiff's decision
to encounter the risk. A central thesis in our society, embodied in
the definition of assumption of risk, is the notion that personal au-
tonomy should be given priority.l18 If the plaintiff's conduct does
not harm others, and the risk and nature of the harm was fully appre-
ciated and voluntarily encountered, then the law should not interfere
by shielding the individual from the consequences of her decision. 119
However, as noted above, the assumptions and rationales underlying
secondary assumption of risk may not be appropriate in all situations
involving defective products.
In many cases, the goals and policies behind imposing liability on
product manufacturers are frustrated by the assumption of risk de-
fense.120 For example, the patent product defect rule and the as-
conduct in order to obtain the desired goal. For example, in Donald v. Moses, 254
Minn. 186, 94 N.W.2d 255 (1959), a pedestrian was injured when he slipped and fell
on an accumulation of snow and ice on the defendant's sidewalk. The court held that
the pedestrian could not assume the risk where there was no evidence "showing al-
ternative routes which were safer than the route selected by the plaintiff." Id. at 196,
94 N.W.2d at 262. Unfortunately, the majority of courts have failed to address the
issue of alternative choices in product liability cases.
118. David A.J. Richards,Justice and Equality, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: NEW INTRO-
DUCTORY ESSAYS IN ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 241, 255 (Tom Regan & Donald Van-
DeVeer eds., 1982).
119. See Products Liability, supra note 2, at 149. Other authors suggest that assump-
tion of risk "is, and always has been, a kind of plaintiff's strict liability," because it
examines factors relevant to whether the plaintiff was the cheapest cost-avoider.
Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1065 (1972).
120. Minnesota law has yet to decide whether the plaintiff has a duty to inspect or
guard against latent product defects. See, e.g., MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUC-
TION GUIDES JIG 130 (Minn. Distr. Judges Ass'n 3d ed. 1986); see also Williams v.
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sumption of risk doctrine conflict with the manufacturer's duty to
warn of product dangers,121 to prevent foreseeable product mis-
use, 12 2 and to develop safety devices.123 Four recent Minnesota de-
cisions illustrate the difficulty of applying the traditional assumption
of risk analysis in products liability cases involving patent product
defects. 124
A. The Death of the Latent-Patent Danger Rule
In Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick,125 a road construction em-
ployee was injured when a crane came in contact with a 7,000-volt
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 804 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
worker's contributory negligence in failing to discover a defect or guard against its
existence was not a defense to strict liability). The issue of patent or obvious product
defects squarely conflicts with the elements of the assumption of risk doctrine. See,
e.g., Comment, Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Apparently
Adopts the Latent-Patent Doctrine, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241 (1977); Barbara L.
Lauer, Torts-Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule: Primary or Secondary Assump-
tion of Risk?, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 373 (1983).
121. In general, there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers. However what con-
stitutes an obvious danger varies with the type of product. See, e.g., Todalen v. United
States Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that chemical man-
ufacturer had a duty to warn that chemical was caustic in dry state, even though em-
ployee knew that chemical was caustic when mixed with water); Balder v. Haley, 390
N.W.2d 855 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that valve manufacturer had duty to
warn of risk of explosion from removing or misusing a gas control valve), rev'd on
other grounds, 399 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1987); Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works,
430 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. 1988) (holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn punch
press operator to keep hands clear where it was not foreseeable that employer would
remove it), rev g 417 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that manufacturer
had duty to warn punch press operators); see also East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578
A.2d 1113 (D.C. 1990) (holding that battery manufacturer had duty to warn of hazard
even though mechanic was familiar with risks of charging battery).
122. See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that employee's removal of detachable saftey bar on hydraulic press was a
foreseeable product misuse).
123. See E.W. Bliss Co. v. Marco Mfg., 258 Cal. Rptr. 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the employer had a duty to equip press with a point of operation guard,
even though the danger was obvious).
124. See Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting la-
tent-patent danger rule and instead applying a balancing test); Halvorson v. Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick, 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976) (holding that
manufacturer was not negligent for failure to install safety devices when risk of elec-
trocution was obvious and known by all employees involved); Jonathan v. Kvaal, 403
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that latent-patent defect rule no longer
relieves manufacturer of liability); McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d
471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that swimmer's awareness of risks of diving into
shallow water in swimming pool precluded placing liability on manufacturer); see also
Joseph F. Chase & Mark M. Walbran, Plaintiffs Peril: Primary Assumption of Risk, MINN.
TRIAL LAw., Summer 1989, at 21 (discussing the expansion of primary assumption of
risk and the latent-patent danger rule).
125. 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1976).
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power line.126 The crane was lowering a metal screed to the pave-
ment when the screed began to sway back and forth.127 In an effort
to stabilize the screed, the plaintiff grabbed the screed with both
hands.' 28 At that time the lifting cable attached to the crane came in
contact with a power line running next to the road, and the employee
was severely injured.129 The employee alleged that the addition of
certain safety devices, such as a warning device or insulation in the
hook, would have prevented the accident.130
The court held that the manufacturer had no duty to install safety
devices on the crane since the risk of injury was open and obvious
and fully appreciated by all the employees involved.'1t In effect, the
employee had assumed the risk of injury from a patent product de-
fect. Six years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled Halvor-
son in Holm v. Sponco Manufacluring.132
In Holm, an electrician's assistant was injured when a crane he was
operating came into contact with a high voltage power line.133 The
assistant acknowledged that he knew of the danger of electrocution
from contact with the wire and that he was familiar with warning de-
cals on the crane which warned against the specific hazard which
caused his injury.'34 The assistant alleged that the addition of cer-
tain safety devices, such as a warning device or insulation of the
crane, would have prevented the accident.'35 The court held that
the obviousness of the danger is only one factor to be balanced in
determining whether the plaintiff used the degree of care required
under the circumstances.'
36
In addition, the court found the patent danger rule "inconsistent
with the underlying policy rationale supporting the strict products
liability doctrine."l13 The patent danger rule "encourages manufac-
turers to be outrageous in their design, to eliminate safety devices,




130. Id. at 50, 240 N.W.2d at 305.
131. Id. at 57, 240 N.W.2d at 308. The plaintiff testified that he knew power lines
could be dangerous. He testified further that he usually checked for power lines
along the road and he knew about the risk of electrocution if the crane came into
contact with a power line. Id. at 51, 240 N.W.2d at 305.
132. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
133. Id. at 208.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 209.
136. Id. at 213.
137. Id. In approving the doctrine of strict liability, the court stated, "not only is
the manufacturer in a better position than a consumer to bear economic loss and to
redistribute it via the cost of his product, but he is also better able to appreciate and
minimize the risk of injury through the production of safer goods." Id.
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and to make hazards obvious."138 Further, the court stated that the
latent-patent danger rule "swallows up the assumption of risk de-
fense" and circumvents Minnesota's Comparative Fault Act.139
B. The Latent-Patent Danger Rule Reincarnated
Only three years after Holm, the latent-patent danger rule was once
again reincarnated in the guise of an assumption of risk analysis. In
McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc. ,140 a swimmer was injured when he
dove into a below-ground pool and struck his head on the bottom. 141
The swimmer alleged that the pool was not properly marked and
lacked warnings about diving into the shallow end.142 The swimmer
was experienced and had used the pool approximately ten times
before he was injured. 143 The court held that the swimmer's aware-
ness of the risk precluded any claim that the admitted failure to warn
was the cause of the injuries. 144 In a strict product liability claim, the
plaintiff "must not be aware of the defect in order to recover."t45
Two years later, on nearly identical facts, the same court, in
Jonathan v. Kvaal,146 implicitly overruled the decision in McCor-
mick.147 A tenant was injured when he made a surface dive into his
138. Id. (quoting Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla.
1979)).
139. Id. Prior to the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act, a finding of assump-
tion of risk or contributory negligence produced harsh results. See Lally v. Crookston
Lumber Co., 82 Minn. 407, 85 N.W. 157 (1901) (holding that an employee volunta-
rily assumed risk of injury when he operated defective saw).
140. 376 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
141. Id. at 472. The accident rendered the swimmer a quadrapalegic.
142. Id. at 473.
143. Id. at 472. The facts indicate the swimmer intended to dive into the shallow
end by performing a "body surf dive." See id. at 473.
144. Id. at 476. The court recognized that the swimming pool industry is more
aware of the risks inherent in shallow water diving than is the general public. In
McCormick, however, the swimmer was not the general public, but rather an individual
fully aware of the risks involved. Id. Cf Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 F.2d 411, 418-
19 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding pool manufacturer liable for lack of warning when an
average swimmer who had never swam in an above-ground pool attempted a shallow
dive and was injured).
145. McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (quoting Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., 285 Minn. 32, 40, 171 N.W.2d 201, 207
(1969)).
146. 403 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
147. See id. at 261-62. The tenant in Kvaal had swum in his landlord's pool ap-
proximately 10 times, had previously performed surface dives, and had nearly twenty
years of swimming experience. Id. at 258. Additionally, the tenant was aware of the
depth markers and the sign warning against diving. Id. Unlike McCormick, however,
the dive resulting in injury occurred at night while the tenant was intoxicated. Id. In
distinguishing McCormick, the court considered relevant that the tenant believed he
was only "a fair swimmer" and that the pool was an above-ground variety. Id. at 261.
1166 [Vol. 18
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/14
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
landlord's vinyl lined, above-ground pool. 14 8 A closely divided court
held that once the defendant acknowledged the existence of a duty
and a breach of that duty, the obviousness of the product defect
would not relieve a product manufacturer of liability.149 Rather, the
obviousness of the defect is only one factor to be considered in de-
termining whether the product was unreasonably dangerous and
whether the plaintiff used the degree of care required under the
circumstances. 150
VII. THE BLURRING OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
AsSUMPTION OF RISK
The assumption of risk doctrine has proved to be troublesome in
other contexts as well. The duty of landowners, for example, tradi-
tionally depended upon the classification of the land entrant.15 1
Under the traditional doctrine, there was generally no obligation to
protect the land entrant against dangers which were open and obvi-
ous.15 2 This open and obvious danger rule was sometimes treated as
a type of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. 153 In
Peterson v. Balach,154 the court abolished the distinction between
licensees and invitees. 155 "Rather than place the entrant (invitee or
licensee) within a rigid classification, the new rule will impose the
duty of reasonable care on both the landowner and entrant." 156
In Armstrong v. Mailand,157 the court defined the landowner's duty
148. Id. at 258.
149. See id. at 260. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the pool
manufacturer and pool owner, finding that the tenant's injuries arose exclusively be-
cause of his own negligence. Id. at 258. On appeal, the manufacturer conceded a
duty owed and a subsequent breach for purposes of summary judgment. Id. at 260.
150. See id. at 261. Rather than focusing on the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk,
the court of appeals held that a manufacturer is required to exercise reasonable care
so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm. To determine if reasonable care ex-
isted, the court applied a balancing test previously adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982). Factors
to be balanced include "the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens,
against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm."
See id. at 261 (quoting Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976)).
151. See generally Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rule Absolving
a Possessor of Land of Liability to Those Coming Thereon for Harm Caused by Dangerous Physi-




154. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
155. Id. at 173, 199 N.W.2d at 647. The court explained that the licensee or invi-
tee classification was no longer controlling, but rather one element to consider in
determining a landowner's liability. Id.
156. Id.
157. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979).
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of care with regard to firefighters.158 In this case, firefighters were
called to fight a fire which developed as a result of an allegedly defec-
tive gas valve on an 11,000 gallon petroleum storage tank.159 The
tank exploded and killed three firefighters. A wrongful death action
was subsequently brought against the landowner.160
The court relied upon Springrose to conclude that "primary as-
sumption of risk is still available to relieve a defendant of his duty to
plaintiff."161 The court went on to explain that a fireman "assumes,
in a primary sense, all risks incident to his firefighting activities ex-
cept for hidden risks which are known by the landowner."162 In an
attempt to further define this concept, the court stated "that land-
owners owe firemen a duty of reasonable care, except to the extent
firemen primarily assume the risk."163
This circular and confused language can only mean that, as a mat-
ter of public policy, firefighters are deemed to assume those risks
incident to their public duty to fight fires, whether those risks are
created by the landowner's negligence or a manufacturer's defective
product. While this rule was subsequently abolished by the state leg-
islature, 164 the notion that primary assumption of risk could relieve a
defendant of a preexisting duty of care was readily adopted.
In Goodwin v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Inc. ,165
the court expanded the proposition advanced in Mailand. In Good-
win, the plaintiff volunteered to assist a non-profit organization in
roofing some dormitories at Legionville.166 She was subsequently
injured when she fell from the roof.167 In analyzing this case, the
court first articulated the rule expressed in Peterson that "a possessor
of land owes to an entrant ... a duty to exercise reasonable care for
158. See generally Note, Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule, 7 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV 749 (1981) (discussing the history and evolution of the fireman's rule in
Minnesota).
159. Id. at 345-47.
160. Id. The firefighter also sought to recover against the provider of the LP gas
and the manufacturer and installer of the LP gas equipment. Id. at 347.
161. Id. at 349.
162. Id. The firefighter's deaths were a result of a boiling liquid expanding vapor
explosion (BLEVE), and evidence indicated that the firefighters had received training
in combatting such an explosion. Id. at 347. The court determined that a BLEVE
was a reasonably apparent danger in fighting a LP gas fire. See id. at 352-53. Thus, an
improperly operated release valve only increased the risk of a BLEVE, but did not
affect a firefighter's reasonable anticipation of a BLEVE. Id. at 353.
163. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 1979).
164. See MINN. STAT. § 604.06 (1990); see also Case Comment, The New Minnesota
Fireman's Rule-An Application of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine: Armstrong v. Mailand,
64 MINN. L. REV. 878 (1980).
165. 422 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
166. Id. at 47-48.
167. Id. at 48. The volunteers were told to "bring their own hammers and to wear
rubber-soled shoes if they were going to help with roofing." Id.
1168 [Vol. 18
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/14
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
her safety."168 Then, however, the court departed from traditional
duty analysis. Rather than expressly stating the scope of the duty
owed to the plaintiff, the court concluded that the plaintiff had pri-
marily assumed the risk of injury because she "chose to encounter a
well-known incidential [sic] risk of roofing; slipping and falling off
the roof."169 As to those risks, the court concluded the respondent
had no duty to protect the plaintiff.170
At the same time, the court quoted Mailand for the proposition
that primary assumption of risk "refers to the concept that an appel-
lant's actions can, in fact, negate a duty owed by a respondent."17
The use of this language is confusing in light of the court's earlier
conclusion that the defendant owed no duty to protect the plaintiff
from slipping and falling off the roof.
Having applied the label of primary assumption of risk to the
plaintiff's conduct, the court avoided the issue of secondary assump-
tion of risk and contributory fault altogether. Perhaps the most un-
fortunate result of Goodwin, however, was the adoption of this
confused language and analysis of primary assumption of risk in An-
dren v. White Rodgers Co., 172 the most recent Minnesota case to apply
assumption of risk in a products liability case.
VIII. THE FACTS IN ANDREN
The plaintiff owned a lake cabin which was heated by a space
heater using liquid propane (LP) gas. 173 The plaintiff bought the
space heater in used condition and installed it himself.'74 While he
had no formal training in LP gas appliances, he had installed over
100 LP gas heaters. 175 The heater worked without difficulty for sev-
eral winters. ' 76
In the winter of 1985, the plaintiff went to check on the cabin.
When he entered the basement he noticed the smell of LP gas. As he
168. Id. at 49 (citing Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647
(1972)).
169. Id. at 50. The dissent argued that primary assumption of risk did not apply in
cases of negligent supervision of invitees. Id. at 51. Moreover, the dissent expressly
attempted to define the defendant's duty of care toward the volunteers. "It is clear
that Legionville owed a continuing duty to Goodwin for her safety. . . . Because
Legionville knew volunteers would be shingling, it had a duty to take precautions for
these people's safety ... such as insisting that a toe board be used." Id. at 51-52.
170. Id. at 50 (quoting Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127
(1974)).
171. Goodwin, 422 N.W.2d at 49.
172. 465 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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went further down into the basement the smell grew stronger. 77
The plaintiff knew that LP gas could explode if exposed to a spark or
an open flame, so he decided to open the basement windows to air
the room out.' 78 Unable to open the windows, he decided to get a
screwdriver from the car. At the top of the basement stairs, just as
he left the basement, he lit a cigarette. The LP gas exploded and he
was severely burned.179
The plaintiff claimed a defective regulator valve had caused the LP
gas to leak. He alleged strict liability, breach of warranty and negli-
gence.18o For purposes of summary judgment, the manufacturer of
the regulator in the gas heater admitted the valve was defective.' 8 '
The stated issue before the court was whether "primary assump-
tion of the risk can be a bar to recovery in a product liability case."
182 The Andren court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff's act of
lighting a cigarette in a room in which he smelled LP gas was primary
assumption of the risk which relieved the defendants of liability for
an allegedly defective valve.)83 The plaintiff's "volitional act [of
lighting the cigarette] constituted consent to relieve respondents of
their duty to protect Andren from harm."' 8 4
IX. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
The court began its analysis by stating the traditional definition of
primary and secondary assumption of risk. Primary assumption of
risk arises "[wihere parties have voluntarily entered a relationship in
which plaintiff assumes well-known, incidental risks. As to those
risks, the defendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff."185 In sec-
ondary assumption of risk, the plaintiff's conduct "is a type of con-
tributory negligence where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a
known and appreciated hazard created by the defendant without re-
lieving the defendant of his duty of care with respect to such haz-
ard."186 Having stated the traditional definition of primary and
secondary assumption of risk, the court went on to blur the distinc-
tions between them.
177. Id. Plaintiff believed that the pilot light on the heater had blown out, and







183. Id. at 106.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 104 (quoting Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127
(1974)).
186. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn. 1979)).
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Relying on the language in Goodwin, the court stated that "primary
assumption of the risk relieves a defendant of liability when the
plaintiff knows and appreciates a danger, yet voluntarily chooses to
chance the risk."1 87 This language is problematic because primary
assumption of risk does not "relieve" a defendant of a pre-existing
duty. Rather, the defendant owes no duty with regard to the well-
known risks incident to the activity. Presumably, the defendant in
Goodwin had no affirmative duty to provide safety equipment, and as
a matter of law, the plaintiff primarily assumed the risk of falling off
the roof.
In contrast, the defendant in Andren owed the plaintiff an estab-
lished duty of care to protect him from the risk of a dangerously de-
fective product. Moreover, the risk of an explosion from a defective
gas regulator was the very risk of harm the defendant's duty was
meant to protect against. Thus, the facts in Andren do not support a
no-duty analysis of implied primary assumption of risk.
Nor do the facts support a limited duty analysis under the implied
primary assumption of risk doctrine. The court relied upon the Arm-
strong "manifestation" test to conclude that the plaintiff's "volitional
act [of lighting a cigarette] constituted consent to relieve respon-
dents of their duty to protect Andren from harm."1 88 The manifes-
tation of consent alluded to in Armstrong, however, was the volitional
act of pursuing an inherently dangerous career in firefighting and
not the careless act of lighting a cigarette. The habitual act of light-
ing a cigarette is not a reliable test of the plaintiff's subjective state
of mind with regard to consent in relieving the defendant of his duty
of care.
Moreover, Andren injected the patent danger rule into the analysis
of the assumption of risk doctrine. The court quoted Prosser and Kee-
ton on Torts, stating, "By voluntarily entering into a situation where
the defendant's negligence is obvious, the plaintiff accepts and con-
sents to it and agrees 'to undertake to look out for himself and re-
lieve the defendant of the duty.' "189 The supreme court, in Holm v.
Sponco Mfg. ,190 expressly rejected the obviousness of the product de-
fect as a determinative factor in products liability cases. If the manu-
facturer is relieved of liability for a patent product defect, it "shifts
the entire economic loss to the injured party, notwithstanding the
fact that the manufacturer was, to some degree, at fault."1 9l
According to Holm and Jonathan, in products liability cases, the
187. Id. at 105.
188. Id. at 106.
189. Id. at 105 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 68, at 485 (5th ed. 1984)).
190. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
191. Id. at 213.
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openness and obviousness of the danger is only one factor to be bal-
anced in determining whether the plaintiff exercised that degree of
care necessary under the circumstances. Perhaps to avoid this con-
clusion, the Andren court added that "primary assumption of the risk
involves subjective and volitional elements which are beyond the
scope of the latent-patent danger rule." 192 The court never explains
what these "volitional elements" might include.
As noted above, the latent-danger rule is just another way of ex-
pressing the rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of
risk.' 93 If the court meant to suggest that, under the patent danger
rule, the defendant need not show that the plaintiff specifically un-
derstood the risk of injury from the product defect, this analysis is
not supported by the facts in Holm orJonathan.194
In Holm and Jonathan, the plaintiffs were specifically aware of the
risk from the product defect.195 Yet their "volitional" acts of operat-
ing a crane and diving head first into a pool were only a factor to be
balanced in determining whether they used the degree of care re-
192. Andren, 465 N.W.2d at 105.
193. See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., 393 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
In Weatherby, the plaintiff was injured when gas splashed from an open gas tank onto
his motorcycle and ignited. Id. at 65. The court reaffirmed the open and obvious
danger rule and stated that a product is not unreasonably dangerous to users if the
"absence of a safety device is open and obvious." Id. The court went on to say:
Care should be taken to distinguish between the "open and obvious rule"
and the affirmative defenses of contributory and comparative negligence
and assumption of the risk. Although the rationale of the "open and obvi-
ous rule" is similar to that of these affirmative defenses, there are important
substantive distinctions between them. In determining, under the "open
and obvious rule," whether the peril from which an injury results is latent or
patent, the decision is made on the basis of an objective view of the product,
and the subjective perceptions of the user or injured party are irrelevant.
.... Actual knowledge by the user of the danger posed by a product is
not necessary in order to invoke the "open and obvious rule."
Id. at 66-67. This definition of the patent danger rule does not include "volitional"
elements beyond the assumption of risk doctrine. Moreover, it is difficult to see how
the plaintiff's decision to use the motorcycle without a gas cap could be deemed to be
anything other than an unreasonable assumption of risk or contributory negligence.
195. In Holm, the plaintiff had operated the crane over 2,000 times in a period of
three years. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Minn. 1982). The plaintiff
was also aware of the tendency of the ladder to drift after the power was discontin-
ued. Id. He also knew that the ladder was not insulated and that he "could be elec-
trocuted if he or the ladder came in contact with an electrical line." Id.
In Jonathan v. Kvaal, 403 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the pool contained
a specific warning against jumping and diving into the shallow end of the pool.
Jonathan, 403 N.W.2d at 258. The plaintiff had used the pool at least 10 times before
the date of the accident. Id. The plaintiff knew about the danger of diving in a shal-
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quired under the circumstances. In light of these decisions, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the habitual act of lighting a cigarette involves
"subjective and volitional" conduct beyond the scope of the latent-
patent danger rule. The act of operating a crane or diving into a
pool involves volitional elements more deliberate than those of the
plaintiff in Andren. Thus, the facts in Andren provide only questiona-
ble support for a primary assumption of risk analysis.
In refuting a secondary assumption of risk analysis, the Andren
court stated, "The manifestations of acceptance and consent dictate
whether primary or secondary assumption of the risk is applicable in
a given case."' 196 The adoption of this "manifestation" test is prob-
lematic for several reasons. First, the test does little to distinguish
between primary and secondary assumption of risk. Under the
court's analysis, the elements of primary and secondary assumption
of risk are identical. If this is true, then why should the defendant be
relieved of liability under primary, but not secondary, assumption of
risk? The answer lies not in some notion of consent, but rather in
the scope of the defendant's duty of care. If the defendant had a
duty to prevent the risk of injury from a defective valve, then secon-
dary assumption of risk should be applied. If the court determines
the defendant had no duty to guard against that product defect, or
the way in which the harm arose, then primary assumption of risk
should be applied. This distinction is consistent with the definition
adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Springrose v. Williams, 197
the majority of Minnesota products liablity cases,198 and the policies
underlying comparative fault. 199
Andren's analysis is also troublesome in another respect. The court
adopted a minimal threshold for supporting the "manifestation" of
consent needed to absolve a defendant of liability. In sport partici-
pant cases, the subjective intent to incur the added risk of injury can
be objectively verified by the willingness to play the game. Thus, the
danger of inferring consent where none actually exists is minimal. In
contrast, under the Andren "manifestation" test, virtually any act
196. Andren, 465 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Armstrong v.
Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Minn. 1979)).
197. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
198. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text; see also Law v. Superior Court,
755 P.2d 1135 (Ariz. 1988) (rejecting the patent danger rule, obviousness of defect
goes to duty and comparative fault); Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 228 (I1.
1990) ("invoking such relative and imprecise characterizations as 'known' or 'obvi-
ous' is certainly no adequate substitute for assessing the scope of the defendant's
duty under the circumstances"); Socorro v. New Orleans, 579 So. 2d 931, 941 (La.
1991) (rejecting "attempts to define the defendant's initial duty in terms of the plain-
tiff's actual knowledge").
199. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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could be held to satisfy the court's implied primary assumption of
risk analysis.
The court found that Andren's act of lighting a cigarette mani-
fested "consent to relieve [the manufacturers] of their duty to pro-
tect Andren from harm."2 00 However, it is doubtful that Andren's
act of lighting the cigarette was ever intended to release the manu-
facturer from a duty of care. As the dissent noted, Andren "would
never have consented to self combustion."201 Arguably, Andren's
conduct may have been unreasonable in light of his knowledge con-
cerning the risk of injury from an explosion. Nonetheless, Andren's
failure to use reasonable care for his own safety is related primarily
to his contributory negligence and not to his subjective state of mind
with regard to consent in relieving the manufacturer of its duty of
care toward him. In this case, Andren's unreasonable assumption of
risk in its secondary form should have been apportioned under the
Comparative Fault Act. 20
2
Despite this conclusion, the court focused on Andren's lack of due
care for his own safety as the determinative factor in apportioning
fault. "Andren had a choice to avoid the danger by not smoking, yet
he voluntarily chose to light the cigarette."203 The court may have
been expressing the notion that a product manufacturer is not an
insurer for all injuries proximately caused by a defective product.
Therefore, the duty of a manufacturer may be limited. However, the
primary assumption of risk doctrine, as noted above, is a blunt tool
for assessing fault and shifts the risk of loss in products liability cases
to the plaintiff.
A better approach is to use the traditional duty analysis for limiting
a manufacturer's liability. Under the traditional duty analysis, the
court controls the scope of the defendant's duty of care by balancing
the relevant policies and social objectives in imposing liability on
product manufacturers.204 This approach fosters the development
of products liability law and reflects a reasoned basis for imposing
fault based on the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct.
200. 465 N.W.2d at 106.
201. Id. (Norton, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that primary assumption of
risk was inapplicable because "Andren never agreed to relieve defendants of their
duty to protect him." Id.
202. Unfortunately, Andren did not discuss the nature of liquid propane (LP) gas,
or the plaintiff's specific knowledge about the risk of an explosion with LP gas. LP
gas, unlike natural gas, is heavier than air and collects in low places. See VIII THE
NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPAEDIA 239-40 (1981). The plaintiff had in-
stalled over 100 LP gas heaters and was aware of the storage tank's capacity. Thus,
he may have reasonably assumed that lighting a cigarette at the top of the basement
stairs would not create a risk of explosion.
203. Id. at 105.
204. See supra Part V.B.
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Under the traditional duty analysis, a product manufacturer may
be held liable if the product in some way creates the necessity for the
plaintiff's subsequent conduct. 205 This focus should be contrasted
with assumption of risk cases, where the relevant inquiry is the plain-
tiff's subjective manifestation of consent and not the defendant's
duty of care.206 Thus, by focusing on the plaintiff's fault, Andren ig-
nored the very reason for imposing liability on a product manufac-
turer. Moreover, this approach eliminates the manufacturer's
contribution in creating risk and displaces the notion of comparative
fault.
An example illustrates the inequities of applying the assumption of
risk doctrine without critically examining the doctrine's risk shifting
effect. Assume the facts in Andren, except that a third party was sit-
ting at the kitchen table when the explosion occurred. The third
party could bring a claim against both Andren and the defendant
manufacturer for injuries caused as a result of their negligence.
Under established principles ofjoint and several liability, fault would
be apportioned among the defendants. The manufacturer could not
shift the entire risk of loss to Andren since both parties would be
causally at fault.207 If this is the case, it is difficult to see why An-
dren's conduct, standing alone, creates a different result.
The same conclusion is reached under third-party indemnity prin-
ciples as well. 2 08 Under the facts of Andren, the manufacturer could
not "shift the entire loss from one culpable wrongdoer to an-
other."209 Under the principles of joint liability and indemnity, all
205. See, e.g., Anderson v. Northwestern Elec. Coop., 760 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1988)
(holding there was no assumption of the risk, as a matter of law, where a truck driver
crawled into a truck, which had come into contact with electric wires, in an effort to
shut off a propane tank and avoid an explosion); Wallace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 389
S.E.2d 155 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an intervening act does not break the
chain of causation if it is a normal response to the situation created by the original
wrongful act).
206. See supra Part V.A.
207. See Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liablity Minnesota Style, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 969 (1989). "The rule of joint and several liability results in the
imposition of liability on multiple defendants whose fault combined to cause a single,
indivisible injury or damage to the plaintiff." Id. at 969.
208. There are only five situations where indemnity is allowed between joint
tortfeasers: (1) where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or vicarious
liability in relation to the other tortfeaser, (2) where the one seeking indemnity has
incurred liability by action at the direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the
one sought to be charged, (3) where the one seeking indemnity is liable because of a
breach of duty owed to him by the other tortfeaser, (4) where the one seeking in-
demnity has incurred liability only because of failure, even through neglect, to dis-
cover or prevent the misconduct of the other tortfeasor, and (5) where there is an
express contact between the parties to shift the risk of loss. Frey v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977).
209. Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977). Prior
1992] 1175
35
Bray: Does Old Wine Get Better with Age or Turn to Vinegar? Assumption
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
tortfeasers must "accept responsibility for damages commensurate
with their own relative culpability."210 Nor could the manufacturer
shift the risk of loss by asserting that Andren's conduct was a super-
seding and intervening cause of the accident.211
In light of the above analysis, the unfairness inherent in Andren's
use of the primary assumption of risk doctrine is apparent. Why
should primary assumption of risk operate to "relieve" the defend-
ant of his causal share of fault when the defendant is unable to do so
under either a joint tortfeaser, indemnity, or superseding cause anal-
ysis? The Comparative Fault Act also supports the notion that even
unreasonable assumption of risk should not necessarily bar recov-
ery. 2 12 Even under the latent-patent danger rule, the plaintiff's
knowledge and appreciation of the product risks are only two factors
to be balanced in determining whether the plaintiff used the degree
of care required under the circumstances.213 By focusing on a plain-
tiff's conduct instead of a defendant's duty of care, Andren placed the
full risk of loss on Andren, despite the fact that the manufacturer was
to the decision in Tolbert, a negligent tortfeaser could seek indemnity from a co-de-
fendant if the "party seeking indemnity was merely 'passive' or 'secondary' as con-
trasted with the 'active' or 'primary' negligence of the other tortfeasor." Id.
210. Id.
211. See Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1980). In order for
Andren's conduct to be a superseding cause of the accident, four elements must be
satisfied: (1) the harmful effect of the plaintiff's conduct must occur after the defend-
ant's negligence, (2) the harmful result must not have been brought about by the
original negligence, (3) the plaintiff's conduct must actively work to bring about a
result which would not have occurred from the defendant's negligence, and (4) it
must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer. Id. In Andren,
at least one element, number three, has not been satisfied.
Moreover, under the Comparative Fault Act, "all independent and concurrent
causes of an accident may be apportioned on a percentage basis." Omnetics, Inc. v.
Radiant Technology Corp., 440 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (interpret-
ing MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1990)). In Andren, both Andren's and the manufacturer's
conduct were independent and concurrent causes of the accident. The manufacturer
was negligent in placing the risk before Andren, and Andren was negligent in failing
to guard against a known and appreciated risk of injury. Andren, 465 N.W.2d 102
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
212. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1990). See, e.g., Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d
1104 (Kan. 1976) (holding that a furnace repairman could not be contributorily neg-
ligent as a matter of law when he re-entered basement to search for gas leak without
shutting off main gas valve); Newland v. City of Winfield, 289 P. 402 (Kan. 1930)
(plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law when he searched for gas
leak with lighted match); Louisville Gas Co. v. Fry, 145 S.W. 748 (Ky. 1912) ("It is
not contributory negligence, as a matter of law, to enter the basement of a home
where gas is perceptibly escaping, or to search for the location of the leak with a
light.").
213. See, e.g., Jonathan v. Kvaal, 403 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
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to some degree at fault.214
If the Andren court was troubled by the potential scope of the man-
ufacturer's liability, it should have applied a traditional duty analysis
to limit the manufacturer's liability without placing an undue empha-
sis on the consumer's conduct or distorting the implied primary as-
sumption of risk doctrine.215 A manufacturer's duty could be limited
to all foreseeable ways in whih the product creates an unreasonable
risk of injury, but not to all injuries proximately caused by a defective
product. In other words, the manufacturer may have a duty to fore-
see the way in which the product will be used and to protect the
consumer from certain foreseeable uses and abuses. This notion is
readily demonstrated in cases involving defective products in the
workplace, 2 16 products which encourage hazardous repairs or main-
tenance, 2 17 and foreseeable product misuse cases. 218
214. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14
(1906) (arguing that all cases of assumption of risk are explainable on the grounds
that either defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff or that the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent).
215. The state of the art defense may relieve a defendant of liability under either
the risk-utility or consumer expectations test. The state of the art defense relieves a
manufacturer of liability if the product defect was unknown or unknowable at the
time the product was marketed. The asbestos and cigarette cases are two examples.
See Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products
Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1982); see also MINN. STAT. § 604.03 (1990)
which provides:
In any action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or
property damage arising out of the manufacture, sale, use or consumption
of a product, it is a defense to a claim against a ... manufacturer... that the
injury was sustained following the expiration of the ordinary useful life of
the product.
The useful life of a product is not necessarily the life inherent in the
product, but is the period during which with reasonable safety the product
should be useful to the user.
Id. at subds. 1, 2.
216. See, e.g., Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 575 N.E.2d 416, 421 (Ohio
1991) (finding a worker's unreasonable assembly of a tire rim was not a defense to a
strict product liability claim); Ingram v. Caterpillar Mach. Corp., 535 So. 2d 723 (La.
1988) (holding that an operator's "careless" use of a forklift did not constitute con-
duct outside of normal use and, therefore, did not absolve manufacturer of liability
for failure to warn).
217. See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn.
1986) (holding that manufacturer had a duty to warn where the design of a safety bar
on a hydraulic press required its removal for maintenance); Crispin v. Volkswagen-
werk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 978 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (finding motorist was
not comparatively negligent in failing to wear seat belt, when manufacturer breached
duty to warn of special need to wear belt because seat was designed to collapse upon
impact).
218. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Southern Minn. Mach. Sales, 442 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (finding that manufacturer breached duty to avoid the risk of harm to
worker's unintended, yet reasonably foreseeable, use of the table saw for freehand
cutting); Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 417 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Minn. Ct.
19921 1177
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The application of the duty analysis in products liability cases will
assist the court in defining the scope of the manufacturer's duty to
provide safe products. The court may decide, for example, that the
risk of an explosion from lighting a cigarette, an act with little utility
and not in response to some necessity created by the defendant's
product, is judicially outside of the scope of the defendant's duty of
care.2 19 In this manner, the policies underlying products liability law
and the notions underlying the Comparative Fault Act could be
achieved without shifting the entire risk of loss on the plaintiff.
X. CONCLUSION
The Andren court may have found primary assumption of risk an
attractive doctrine because a court may decide as a matter of law that
the defendant is absolved of liability. However, the Comparative
Fault Act and the policies underlying products liability are best
served if primary assumption of risk is reserved for those cases in
which the plaintiff's consent to incur the risk is manifest and certain.
In view of the relationship between a product manufacturer and a
consumer, it will be a rare case in which the plaintiff's conduct is
sufficiently manifest and certain to justify the application of the im-
plied primary assumption of risk doctrine.
Ann D. Bray
App. 1988) (holding that a duty to warn arises if a manufacturer anticipates that an
operator might use a machine in a manner which increases risk), rev'd, 430 N.W.2d
465 (Minn. 1988).
219. In the alternative, the court could have found that no reasonable jury would
have apportioned Andren's fault less than the manufacturer's fault. In Minnesota, if
the plaintiff's fault in causing the accident is found to be 51% or more, they are
barred from recovery. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1990). "Contributory fault
does not bar recovery in an action by any person ... if the contributory fault was not
greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any dam-
ages allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to
the person recovering." Id.
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